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Abstract
Despite massive investment in China’s censorship program, internet platforms in
China are rife with criticisms of the government and content that seeks to organize
opposition to the ruling Communist Party. Past works have attributed this “open-
ness” to deliberate government strategy or lack of capacity. Most, however, do not
consider the role of private social media companies, to whom the state delegates
information controls. I suggest that the apparent incompleteness of censorship is
largely a result of principal-agent problems that arise due to misaligned incentives of
government principals and private media company agents. Using a custom dataset
of annotated leaked documents from a social media company, Sina Weibo, I find
that 16% of directives from the government are disobeyed by Sina Weibo and that
disobedience is driven by Sina’s concerns about censoring more strictly than com-
petitor Tencent. I also find that the fragmentation inherent in the Chinese political
system exacerbates this principal agent problem. I demonstrate this by retrieving
actual censored content from large databases of hundreds of millions of Sina Weibo
posts and measuring the performance of Sina Weibo’s censorship employees across
a range of events. This paper contributes to our understanding of media control in
China by uncovering how market competition can lead media companies to push
back against state directives and increase space for counterhegemonic discourse.
∗Postdoctoral Fellow, Program in Quantitative Social Science, Dartmouth College,
Silsby Hall, Hanover, NH 03755 (E-mail: blake.a.p.miller@dartmouth.edu).
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Introduction
Why do scathing criticisms, allegations of government corruption, and content about
collective action make it past the censors in China? Past works have theorized that
regime strategies or state-society conflicts are the reason for incomplete censorship. While
these factors likely contribute to incomplete censorship, I suggest that incomplete cen-
sorship results in part from delegation of censorship to private companies which creates
a principal-agent problem. Censorship directives are passed through a tangled network
of multiple government principals and are delegated to private social media corporations.
Government principals and media corporation agents are driven by competing logics: the
government logic of information control and the market logic of satisfying user demand
for information, respectively.
Using a unique corpus of leaked documents from a social media company, Sina Weibo,
I demonstrate that these conflicting logics are the cause of much of censorship’s apparent
incompleteness. I find that 16% of directives from the government are disobeyed by
Sina Weibo and that disobedience is driven by Sina’s concerns about censoring more
strictly than competitor Tencent. I also find that the fragmentation inherent in the
Chinese political system exacerbates this principal agent problem. Fragmentation results
in decentralization of censorship enforcement, competition between government agencies
over censorship objectives, and non-uniform distribution of regulatory leverage across the
many government agencies in charge of delegating censorship and sanctioning social media
companies for non-compliance.
This paper contributes to our understanding of media control because it shows that
market competition impacts information control outcomes, breaking with a large body of
works on information control that assume market competition doesn’t matter. This paper
complements the work of Yang (2013) by showing that market concerns open space for
contention in China, but it also emphasizes that market competition is the main driving
force behind this opening. Internet businesses push back on government controls in an
effort to appear “more free” than competitors, leading to expanded space for contention.
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1 The Southern Weekend Incident
Each year, the liberal Chinese newspaper Southern Weekend writes a New Years editorial
on a theme they would like to characterize the coming year. In January of 2013, they
chose the theme “China Dream, Constitutional Dream,” stressing the need for progress
in the coming year on strengthening the rule of law and protecting rights enshrined in the
constitution. After the editorial team submitted their final draft to the Guangzhou Pro-
paganda Department and received no edits, they assumed everything had been approved
for publication. The editors and Southern Weekend’s readers were surprised when they
opened their newspapers and found a fawning paean to the Party in place of the expected
boundary-pushing editorial that had become the newspaper’s trademark. The article
boasted, “we are closer to the Chinese dream than ever before” among other platitudes.
This clumsy reworking of the editorial resulted in a strike by Southern Weekend edi-
torial staff and sizable student protests in major Chinese cities. The strike and protests
gained momentum through coordination and discussion on major Chinese social network-
ing sites such as Sina Weibo1, despite four strongly worded directives from the Central
Propaganda Department and top leadership to cease all such discussion. This apparent in-
capacity to control perhaps the most threatening type of information online—information
with potential to fuel student-led collective action2—may come as a surprise to many. The
Chinese state is often represented in press and academic writing as a monolith3, with high
capacity to control information flows using the many advanced methods of censorship at
its disposal. However, in many circumstances, it seems that intense pressure from the
1According to monthly active user statistics, throughout most of the log data, Sina Weibo was the
second largest social network in China, behind Qzone. WeChat, China’s most popular social platform is a
messaging app that is similar to What’sApp, but with several social, payment, and service features tacked
on. Though WeChat’s monthly active users surpassed Sina Weibo in Q1 of 2012, it is not a competitor
with Sina Weibo in the same way as Tencent Weibo is; both have a similar microblog platform, ostensibly
inspired by Twitter. Because Tencent Weibo has been in beta for several years, Tencent does not report
MAU numbers in its annual financial reports, however, most measures of active users during the period
in which the logs were created put Sina Weibo comfortably in the lead.
2The Chinese Communist Party has experienced many student-led movements that have presented
clear threats to its grip on power. Students initialized and sustained the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, a movement resulting in the dismantling of state and party institutions through arbitrary
mass violence. Student—led movements on two separate occasions—in 1976 and in 1989—sparked mass
protests which at the time seemed capable of threatening the CCP’s monopoly on power.
3Much work on censorship assumes that either the government is a unitary actor or that the central
government is the main enforcer of censorship. Formal literature, often for the sake of parsimony, defines
“the government” or “the autocrat” as the singular actor and practitioner of censorship (Lorentzen, 2014;
Guriev & Treisman, 2015; Gehlbach & Sonin, 2014; Chen & Xu, 2016; Egorov, Guriev, & Sonin, 2009)
(King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013) draw inferences from censorship outcomes to measure a singular intention
of a single government actor: to allow criticism but censor content with “collective action potential.”
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highest levels of the party and government fails to move social media companies like Sina
Weibo to act.
2 Delegation, Fragmentation, and Agency Loss
During the SouthernWeekend editorial incident, the Propaganda Department of Guangzhou4
and the Central Propaganda Department5 were involved in attempts to control the spread
of information on the event. Despite these urgent attempts to censor all mention of this
incident, a novel leaked dataset from 2011-2014 documents that popular social media com-
pany Sina Weibo willfully ignored directives to remove content related to the incident on
their platform. Sina’s calculus was clear. By providing more information about the strike
and protests, they could attract information-seeking users away from chief competitor
Tencent.6 One log of company decisions instructs employees to “not be stricter than Ten-
cent,” and to hold off on implementing government directives until “urged to block content
a second time.” When told to delete users, Sina instructed employees to block users tem-
porarily and unblock them the following day “as soon as you receive instructions.”7 The
case of the Southern Weekend editorial incident illustrates how government fragmentation
and delegation of censorship to private corporations can result in incomplete censorship
outcomes. In this case, the Central Propaganda Department, the Guangzhou Propaganda
Department, and the Beijing Municipal Government agencies directly involved in man-
aging Sina Weibo had different objectives and were unable to adequately monitor and
sanction the company. By delegating censorship to Sina Weibo, concerns over user re-
tention and competitiveness became a factor in the company’s decision to comply with
4Tuo Zhen, the head of the Guangdong Propaganda Department at the time was concerned
about limiting the fallout in response to the editorial incident, especially since he was being blamed
by both the public and the Central Government. See this archived analysis for more informa-
tion: https://web.archive.org/web/20180730135458/http://chinamediaproject.org/2013/01/07/inside-
the-southern-weekly-incident/
5The original directives can be found archived at the following links:
http://www.webcitation.org/71yPYfpyj, http://www.webcitation.org/71yPahJIQ,
and http://www.webcitation.org/71yPeE80B
6Tencent is the largest ICP company in China. It owns WeChat, Tencent Weibo, and QZone, three
of China’s most popular social platforms. It is Sina’s most direct competitor.
7Full text of log from 1/5/2013: “There is a lot of related content on Tencent. After we reported
[their lack of implementation] to the Network Management Office, Tencent implemented [censorship of
the content]. Currently [Sina] Weibo is partially carrying out instructions to block content. First prevent
retweets on content flagged [by the Network Management Office]. When urged to block content a second
time, fully implement directives. With respect to banning users, for the meantime do not implement
[user bans]... handle users relative to Tencent’s [level of] implementation. We should not be stricter than
Tencent. Today maintain user blocks, tomorrow as soon as you receive instructions release the block.”
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directives. By Sina’s calculations, the cost of flouting government directives outweighed
the benefits of increased user engagement. In this section I outline this theory in detail.
In subsequent sections, I present evidence in support of this theory from censorship logs
like the one mentioned above and large databases that measure censorship outcomes on
the Sina Weibo platform.
2.1 Corporate Delegation Leads to Agency Loss
Private companies play a crucial role in the process of censorship, as they bear the ultimate
responsibility for removing content from their platforms. Despite their central role, private
companies are too often missing from models of information manipulation. In China,
censorship is delegated and regulated through internet content providers (ICP) licenses.
ICP licenses are necessary to operate an internet business in China. These licenses can
be revoked or suspended if ICPs do not comply with government directives.
Sina Weibo and many ICPs like it have had to balance user and shareholder demand
with regulatory pressures from government agencies since they were first founded. In 2014,
when Sina Weibo became listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange, it made these concerns
explicit. In its regulatory filing with the SEC, it included “regulation and censorship of
information disseminated over the internet in China” as a major risk that could affect its
share price. In the filing, Sina Weibo also noted that censorship “may adversely affect our
user experience and reduce users’ engagement and activities on our platform as well as
adversely affect our ability to attract new users to our platform.”8 Since Sina’s listing on
NASDAQ the company has been fined several times by Chinese government agencies for
failing to meet censorship regulations. Sina’s user engagement and activity has declined in
recent years, in part due to the rising popularity of WeChat, a chat-based social networking
site like WhatsApp. Some analysts, however, have attributed this decline to increasing
perceptions of Sina Weibo as a heavily-censored platform.9
I argue that “incomplete” censorship is largely a result of a clash between ICPs re-
sponding to popular demand for information and government actors responding to pres-
sures to maintain social stability and protect their position within government. The
process of delegating to private internet companies creates a principal-agent problem.
8Full article accessible here: https://web.archive.org/web/20180812134506/
9See: http://www.webcitation.org/72Kwc4BJ7
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Government principals delegate censorship to private internet companies through direc-
tives: verbal or written instructions providing details about how these private internet
companies are supposed to handle certain kinds of objectionable content. Private internet
companies then decide if and how they will comply. Because there is often a misalign-
ment of preferences between the government principal and the ICP agent, private internet
companies may ignore the directive or partially implement it. Because of this disobedi-
ence, the delegating principal suffers agency loss: agents acting against their principals’
interests.
Competition between private internet companies further exacerbates this problem. In
China, each government principal delegates censorship to several private internet com-
panies, meaning that there are multiple agents involved in China’s system of censorship.
Rundlett & Svolik (2016) have shown that when a principal has multiple agents, principals
suffer agency loss. Private internet companies benefit from having compelling information
on their platforms. However, compelling content may also be considered “harmful infor-
mation” to the authorities. Highly motivated users who are seeking this information often
hop from platform to platform when content is censored (Roberts, 2017). By censoring
less, private internet companies can attract these users to their platform and away from
their competitors. This competition over users results in a race to the bottom as each
company strategically tries to skirt directives more than competitors. Companies seek to
jointly minimize the cost of censorship (lost user retention and engagement) and the cost
of non-compliance with government directives.
Private internet companies deliberately shirk, lack capacity to implement directives,
or some combination of the two. Private internet companies can take advantage of hidden
information about their technical capabilities and budgets to invest as little as possible
in developing high-performance censorship systems. They can also shirk, as their effort
censoring content is not easy to measure or observe. Private internet companies take
advantage of hidden actions and hidden information to comply with directives only when
doing so will benefit the company’s bottom line.
2.2 Bureaucratic Fragmentation Leads to Agency Loss
Fragmentation of China’s political system further complicates censorship delegation. While
on paper the Chinese political system is rigidly hierarchical, in practice, contestation be-
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tween state and party organs, and bureaucracies with overlapping policy domains is com-
mon throughout the system. The findings of this analysis confirm earlier suppositions
about the fragmentation inherent in the Chinese political system.10 This fragmented
system, which Oksenberg & Lieberthal (1988) coined “fragmented authoritarianism” is
characterized by de facto veto power of local governments when implementing central
policies and the tangled lines of authority in China’s vast bureaucracy. I argue that in-
complete censorship is in part due to the fragmentation of China’s political system. This
fragmentation leads to agency loss—disobedience of, or incapacity to implement govern-
ment directives—due to two major attributes of China’s system of censorship: common
agency and local bias.
First, common agency11 of private internet companies gives them discretion about
which agency’s directives to follow. Many bureaucracies in China have the authority to
delegate censorship to private internet companies. This makes monitoring and sanctioning
of private internet companies difficult because each individual bureaucracy must rely
on their own limited resources in order to monitor compliance after they have issued
their directive. Private internet companies receive directives from multiple principals
(sometimes referred to as “common agency”), so they often have discretion about which
directives to follow, especially with principals do not have uniform preferences (Calvert,
McCubbins, & Weingast, 1989), as is often the case in China. Because of this, it is not
uncommon to observe inconsistencies in the way content is censored across private internet
companies due to this discretion.12
Second, the power to enforce directives is locally biased, i.e. power is concentrated in
the locality of an ICP’s headquarters. Local agencies where media companies are head-
quartered have more control over what gets censored as they have access to the most
proximate and effective levers of power to enforce compliance with directives. This local
bias was clear in interviews conducted in Cairns (2016) that suggested that the “[Bei-
10See O’Brien (1994); Montinola, Qian, & Weingast (1995); Lieberthal (1995); Jin, Qian, & Weingast
(2005); Zheng (2007); Stern & O’Brien (2012); Mertha (2009)
11Many government agencies have the power to issue directives to single private internet companies.
12For example, there is significant correlation among censored keyword lists in Chinese game chat-
rooms when they are created by the same parent company or developer, but very weak correlation among
lists within the same Chinese provincial or city jurisdiction (Knockel, Ruan, & Crete-Nishihata, 2017).
Previous work has found inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship across platforms and com-
panies operating in China, including search engines (Villeneuve, 2008), blogging services (MacKinnon,
2009), chat apps (Crandall et al., 2013), live streaming (Crete-Nishihata et al., 2016), and mobile games
(Knockel et al., 2017), which suggests companies have flexibility and discretion when interpreting and
implementing censorship directives.
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jing Municipal Government’s] de facto political power as regulator of Sina Weibo” caused
“cross-jurisdictional conflicts.” When authorities outside of Beijing wanted content cen-
sored, they had to lobby Beijing-based bureaucracies. This local bias leads to agency
loss because the central government and local governments outside of the ICP’s jurisdic-
tion do not have the same implements of enforcement and are easier to ignore. Because
private internet companies are constantly weighing the cost of non-enforcement and ex-
pected revenue from satisfying user demand, private internet companies will pay outsized
attention to local directives, despite being national platforms. Without a centralization
of the power to issue and enforce directives, private internet companies can selectively
ignore directives from outside of their jurisdiction.
The complexities of information control in China’s fragmented system have been well-
studied as they relate to traditional media. In a study of newspapers, Stockmann (2013)
finds that during the reform of China’s media system, fragmentation posed a challenge to
state monitoring and sanctioning of commercialized newspapers. She argues that factional
affiliations, rank of a media company’s sponsoring agency, and geographical jurisdiction
defined a “discursive space,” giving media companies greater freedom to report more
critically about opposing factions, lower ranked agencies, or other geographical regions.
Mertha (2009) finds that policy entrepreneurs make use of the media to lobby and appeal
to various fragmented interests across China’s bureaucracy. Others have noted the many
conflicts between central and local governments, party and state organs, propaganda
departments in different localities, and media organizations and regulators (Brady, 2009;
Lynch, 1999; Shambaugh, 2007).
3 Data and Methods
To test the above theoretical claims, that fragmentation and corporate delegation re-
sult in outcomes that deviate from the intentions of delegating government principals,
researchers face a number of challenges. Despite the vital role private internet compa-
nies play in China’s system of censorship, there has been a dearth of data on them and
very little scholarship dedicated to them. Much of the available data used to study Chi-
nese censorship consists of only content and censorship outcomes. These data do not
provide any information about the interactions between individuals in government and
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between private internet companies and government actors that determine what is and
is not censored. Due to limitations of available data, assumptions that censorship out-
comes can serve as a measure of government intent are common, despite the central role
non-government actors play in the process.13
3.1 Log Data
To address these shortcomings, I have created a custom dataset of censorship logs—notes
taken in the process of censorship at Sina Weibo, one of China’s most popular social
networking sites. This dataset is the first of its kind to capture the entire process of
Chinese censorship, from a government directive to a private internet company, to that
private internet company’s decision on how or whether to comply. With the help of
research assistants, I have coded these logs by content, the bureaucracy issuing directives
to Sina Weibo, and whether or not Sina Weibo implemented these directives. Log data
adds empirical support to the theoretical claims detailed earlier in the following ways:
First, because these logs measure disobedience, they can provide insights into the
relative power of bureaucracies to delegate censorship. By examining the variance in
Sina’s rates of compliance with directives across different bureaucracies, we can observe
how fragmentation leads to agency loss. If fragmentation results in agency loss, rates of
compliance with directives should be correlated with a bureaucracy’s power to monitor
and sanction Sina Weibo.
Second, logs include direct and indirect information about the reasons behind non-
compliance with directives. Occasionally managers explain their decisions to comply or
disobey government directives. If corporate delegation leads to agency loss due to concerns
about competitors and the adverse impact of censorship on user experience, Sina Weibo
managers should express these concerns in the logs. Other less direct evidence of profit
motivations can be observed in how thoroughly Sina censors content that is harmful to
its business interests and content that is harmful to government interests. By comparing
the censorship rates of Sina-related news events and censorship on behalf of a government
actor, these logs can add support to claims that Sina Weibo factors market concerns
into its censorship efforts. Comparing censorship rates of content that is harmful to
13State media describes the process of delegation to private actors in detail in a report here:
http://www.webcitation.org/72ZsG5mc7
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Sina’s business interests and content that is harmful to government interests can also
demonstrate that agency loss is not simply due to a lack of capacity, but rather due to
deliberate and strategic shirking.
3.2 Event Data
Users seek information at different rates depending on the type of event, and more user
attention is usually more threatening to the government. Because Sina is concerned with
audience demand, they may increase or decrease their censorship efforts in response to
audience interest and, by proxy, sensitivity. To see how censorship implementation varied
by audience demand for information for sensitive events, I used data from annual “blue
books,” policy briefs written for government cadres, on “social opinion and emergency
management” compiled by the Institute for Public Opinion Research of Shanghai Jiao
Tong University and published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. These blue
books collate reports written by academics, government officials, and policy experts and
offer suggestions for policy changes and improvements in the coming year. Using these
events as a sample ensures that I am analyzing events that public opinion experts found
noteworthy, and where “public opinion supervision” (舆论监督) and/or “public opinion
guidance” (舆论引导) was potentially necessary. These reports include 300 events (60
events for each year from 2010-2014) ranked by an index of search volume across several
services. Each year’s cases are selected from the top 1200 events with the highest search
volume index14 based on their designation as a “public opinion emergency” that would
be salient to opinion and thought workers, the intended audience of these “blue books.”
3.3 Censorship Outcomes Data
For each of the events above, I measure how thoroughly Sina carried out censorship
on its platform by searching large datasets of historical Sina Weibo posts for the exact
content targeted for censorship in logs. For this analysis I use two datasets that measure
censorship on the Sina Weibo platform: Free Weibo and Weiboscope. The Free Weibo
dataset includes 47 million weibo posts spanning from 2009-2018 and the Weiboscope
14The search volume index is calculated as the average of news search volume, social networking
platform search volume, blog search volume, Sina Weibo search volume, video search volume, and WeChat
Public Accounts search volume.
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dataset includes 226 million posts from only 2012.15 Using these data I compare the
instructions in the logs to actual censorship outcomes at the event level.
To compare log content to actual Weibo post content, I first had research assistants
manually identify logs relevant to each of the 320 events from “blue books” by searching
within a month window on either side of the event date. For each relevant log, research
assistants then extracted the full content text from logs, stripping away instructions on
censorship and government directives that usually go along with log text. After content
from relevant logs was extracted, I searched large databases of censorship outcomes for
exact or near-exact text matches to each individual log’s content.
Running several searches of 273 million Weibo posts is not a trivial task. To identify
exact or near-exact matches to posts mentioned in the logs, I needed to build a rudimen-
tary search engine, building an inverted index of each of the Weibo posts in these large
databases. For each log, I then scored the relevance of each post in the two large databases
of Weibo Posts using the Okapi BM25 ranking algorithm. The Okapi BM25 algorithm
was the gold standard for search engine ranking prior to recent advances in deep learning
and was the core technology behind the Bing search engine for several years. With each
post in these databases ranked according to relevance to the text extracted from the logs,
research assistants then identified posts from each set of search results that exactly or
almost exactly matched the post targeted in logs. Results were considered near-exact
matches if they contained the entire query text with either small editions, or a a few
words replaced with synonyms, homophones, or homoglyphs. Using the final dataset of
retrieved matches, I estimated the proportion of posts that were actually censored by Sina
Weibo for each event. The results of this procedure are visualized in Figure 1.
15Both datasets are constructed by recording a post soon after it has been created and later querying
for that post at fixed intervals to see if the post has been censored or deleted.
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4 Empirical Implications and Results
Figure 1: Censorship Rate of Retrieved Weibo Posts Mentioned in Logs
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Each point on the figure represents a event where posts were retrieved and its size is proportional
to how many posts were retrieved. The y-axis, “rate of censorship implementation” is the number
of retrieved posts that were censored over the total number of posts retrieved. The x-axis, “public
interest in the event” is the search volume index gathered from blue books. The regression line
and confidence intervals are from a weighted LOESS model. The average rate of censorship
implementation is .38.
4.1 Corporate Delegation Leads to Agency Loss
I argue that incomplete censorship is due in part to a clash between the market logic
driving the behavior of private companies and the logic of control that guides governments.
In other terms, market demand for information sometimes clashes with the informational
preferences of government actors. In this section, I argue that corporate delegation leads
to agency loss for three main reasons. First, market competition incentivizes Sina to
prefer to censor less than its competitors, leading to a race to the bottom. Second, Sina
Weibo is technically limited in its ability to comply with government directives, resulting
in agency loss. Third, Sina Weibo deliberately shirks in order to minimize the cost of
censorship and to minimize impact of censorship on the usability of its platform.
The logs provide many examples of Sina Weibo’s concerns about censoring more than
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competitor, Tencent Weibo. In one instance Sina Weibo was instructed to delete all con-
tent related to a murder case that had garnered much public interest. According to logs,
Sina Weibo monitored the compliance of Tencent Weibo, alerted the Supervision Depart-
ment to their non-compliance, and delayed implementation of directives until they could
be assured that Tencent had also complied with directives.16 In another example, the
Network Management Office ordered Sina Weibo to remove a popular account on their
service. After seeing that Tencent had not complied with removing the same user on
their platform, Sina Weibo drafted a response to the Network Management Office: “Since
Tencent hasn’t deleted the account, we are unable to delete the account at this point in
time.” In several other cases, Sina waited until Tencent complied to implement direc-
tives to delete user accounts. During several sensitive events such as the annual Spring
Festival Gala—a Chinese propaganda variety show and most-watched television show on
the planet17—Sina Weibo instructed employees to avoid censoring more comments on the
official television broadcaster’s account than competitor Tencent. Sina also went to great
lengths to limit positive news about Tencent on its platform. When news broke about a
mass purge of bots on Tencent, Sina Weibo employees were instructed to prevent retweets
of posts that praised Tencent’s actions. Similarly, when Xi Jinping visited Tencent, Sina
Weibo employees were instructed to prevent retweets of all related posts. Conservatively,
these patterns in logs suggest that Sina Weibo’s concerns about remaining competitive
with Tencent drove many of their decisions to comply with directives. Preferences to
censor slightly less than competitors, and the low level of implementation of directives is
consistent with a race to the bottom.
Though we observe Sina deliberately disobeying directives in logs, in many instances,
it seems that Sina’s poor censorship performance is due to a lack of capacity. In Sina’s
IPO documents they claimed, “although we attempt to monitor the content posted by
users on our platform, we are not able to effectively control or restrict content generated
or placed on our platform by our users.” This statement appears to be at least partially
16Log entry from December 26, 2011 reads: Supervision Department demands to eliminate related
content to the Henan Shenqiu murder case that caused the death of four children and injury of one child.
Currently, we told Supervision Department that there are many related posts on Tencent Weibo and
asked Tan Chao to negotiate. They have not yet responded. Previously, we censored any searches of the
incident but didn’t eliminate everything. Currently, the parameter is to process anything attacking the
party or government policy. If there are other situations, report immediately.
17Viewership of the New Year’s Gala is around 700 million. In 2012, Guinness World Records gave the
show a audience of 498.7 million and named it the, “Most Watched National Network TV Broadcast.”
See http://www.webcitation.org/71y5Jcwx5.
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accurate. In some logs, Sina Weibo appears overwhelmed. During a major collective
action incident in 2012 involving mass protest and several self-immolations in Tibet, Sina
Weibo struggled to keep up with a large magnitude of takedown requests about Tibet. At
one point, Sina Weibo employees sent an SOS to all department heads as they struggled
to mobilize enough employees to meet increasing censorship demands.18 Even in less dire
circumstances, Sina Weibo appears to perform relatively poorly. In Figure 1, we see that
Sina Weibo usually does not perfectly follow through with the decisions to comply with
censorship directives. The average rate of censorship of Sina Weibo posts from the Free
Weibo and Weiboscope databases that exactly match posts in the logs is .38. This low rate
of censorship implementation may be for one of two reasons: unintentional low capacity,
or deliberate shirking.
To test whether Sina’s poor performance was exclusively due to low censorship capac-
ity, I identified all logs that referenced news events about Sina Weibo that were potentially
damaging to the company’s reputation or bottom line. All posts mentioning Sina had al-
ready been labeled by research assistants, making the search easier. In total I identified
three such news events in the logs: 1) discussions of Sina’s IPO, 2) discussions of new
research measuring the speed of Sina’s censorship, and 3) Reuters interviews with former
Sina Weibo employees who worked as content censors. To measure how well Sina followed
through on these decisions to censor content, I retrieved exact or near-exact matches of
content mentioned in the logs from the Free Weibo database using methods described in
detail above. In total I retrieved 33 posts, 24 of which were censored, an implementation
rate of .73. This rate of implementation is significantly higher than the Blue Book rate
mentioned earlier (.38) according to a 2-sample chi-squared test of equality of proportions
at the 95% confidence level. This evidence suggests that Sina Weibo has the capability
to more thoroughly censor content in response to government directives, but chooses not
to. I find that the low rate of actual censorship is likely at least somewhat deliberate.
These quantitative measures are consistent with Sina’s general instructions about how
intensely to censor content. Employees are at times instructed to deliberately shirk and
to obstruct the process of censorship by delaying directives and prolonging bargaining
18Log entry from February 1, 2012 reads: Recently there have been a lot of demands to delete posts
about Tibet!! There is no way we can add this many banned keywords; if we do so, the rate of posts
needing investigating will increase too much. We have already added several keywords related to Tibetan
independence, Communist Party [policy in Tibet], [police] killings, but the number of keywords keeps
increasing... I don’t know what to say!! Every department head, please disseminate! This is extremely
urgent!!!
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between delegating government agencies and Sina. In the days preceding the Southern
Weekend editorial incident mentioned in the beginning of this paper, log documents begin
with a general notice urged employees to “negotiate as much as possible” and “defer
implementation of censorship requests from the Supervision Department and Internet
Management Office,” Sina Weibo’s two chief regulators. The notice went on to instruct
employees to “not process too many user posts” and to “not be too stringent.” Just
three months earlier, a similar general notice had suggested the opposite. Employees
were urged to “tighten” their “control measures” and to “resolutely eliminate all posts
relating to negative incidents, rumors about the Politburo Standing Committee and their
families, collective action content, coups, power struggles related to the 18th CCP Party
Congress, Ling Jihua, Central Public Security Bureau, Bo Xilai, etc.” But even this
strongly worded notice instructed employees to refrain from immediately implementing
“especially unreasonable directives.”
Finally, as is the case in any workplace, part of Sina Weibo’s lack of capacity to
censor content comes from agency loss due to rogue or incompetent employees. Of course,
the individual who leaked this entire cache of documents to the press was a Sina Weibo
employee.
4.2 Bureaucratic Fragmentation Leads to Agency Loss
Leaked censorship logs from Sina Weibo do not depict a system of censorship that is hi-
erarchical, centralized and efficient. Rather, many bureaucracies appear to have varying
degrees of authority, do not appear to coordinate their censorship directives, and appear
to at times be in conflict with one another. Logs document 3 main bureaucracies in
charge of censorship at Sina Weibo, and a long tail of other bureaucracies with the power
to issue directives to the company (see Figure 2). To measure the relationship between
fragmentation and agency loss, I calculate rates of disobedience across multiple bureau-
cracies, and confirm that these patterns match theoretical expectations. I then argue
for two mechanisms behind this relationship. First, common agency of private internet
companies gives them discretion about which agency’s directives to follow. Second, the
power to enforce directives is locally biased, i.e. power is concentrated in the locality of
an ICP’s headquarters.
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Figure 2: Agencies and Individuals Influencing Censorship on Sina Weibo
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If bureaucratic fragmentation leads to agency loss, we should expect to see differences
in the responsiveness of Sina Weibo to certain bureaucracies. Three bureaucracies are
most commonly called: The Beijing Municipal Internet Propaganda Management Office
(Internet Management Office), the Public Information and Internet Safety Supervision
Department of the Beijing Public Security Bureau (Supervision Department), and the
State Council Information Office (SCIO).19 Personnel and budgets of the Internet Man-
agement Office and the Supervision Department are controlled by the Beijing Municipal
Government. In a handful of cases, the State Council Information Office delegates directly
to Sina Weibo, but most of the time it issues instructions to the Supervision Department
and Internet Management Office to delegate to private internet companies. Though it has
informal authority to delegate to these agencies, it does not have leverage over budgets
and personnel. Because Beijing Municipal Government agencies are directly responsible
for monitoring and sanctioning Sina, they should be obeyed at higher rates than the State
Council Information Office. Beijing Municipal Government has strong incentives to keep
19The logs confirm much of the basic bureaucratic structures that monitor and direct censorship at
Sina Weibo as identified in Cairns (2016).
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Sina in check, as they will ultimately bear responsibility for failure to manage Sina when
they are evaluated for promotion at the end of their terms. In the logs, I find that over-
all, 16% of all directives are disobeyed. Beijing municipal bureaucracies, the “Network
Management Office” and the “Supervision Department” are disobeyed at rates of 15%
and 17% respectively. By contrast, the SCIO is disobeyed 20% of the time. Though these
measures of disobedience do indicate that the SCIO is disobeyed more often than Beijing
bureaucracies, there are not enough SCIO directives to distinguish a statistically signifi-
cant difference in the two proportions. To address this limitation, I examine the data for
evidence for two theorized mechanisms linking bureaucratic fragmentation to agency loss:
common agency and local bias.
If common agency of private internet companies results in agency loss, we might expect
to see instances in the data where agencies delegating censorship send different directives
to Sina Weibo, and where Sina Weibo chooses to implement the more lenient or less-
specified directive. This is a very hard test to pass because the logs are usually not
detailed enough to show discrepancies between directives from two agencies. Directives
are usually not copied verbatim and are summarized, often in shorthand. Despite this,
there are a handful of logs where we observe behavior consistent with common agency
leading to agency loss. One such log involves large-scale protests in the city of Shifang
in July of 2012 over a copper plant local residents believed was causing health problems.
The Supervision Department, a Beijing municipal state public security organ directed
Sina Weibo to remove all collective action content from their site. At the same time, the
Internet Management Office, a Beijing municipal party propaganda organ directed Sina
to remove a list of specific posts.20 The latter order was easier to implement and was
unlikely to completely shut down discussion of the event on Sina Weibo. Sina opted to
ignore the first order and implement the latter order.
This evidence has its limitations. These handful of accounts confirm that common
agency resulted in some agency loss, but it is impossible with these data to determine the
magnitude of this agency loss. Previous work on delegation, however, has shown that in
situations where there are multiple principals, agent discretion results in higher agency
loss than if there was only one delegating principal (Calvert et al., 1989).
20A log from July 3, 2012 reads: “Regarding the Shifang incident, the Supervision Department is cur-
rently demanding that we eliminate any inflammatory and mobilizing content. The Internet Management
Office has no clear directives but has sent over a list of individual posts to process, ordinary requests like
these should be followed.”
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Table 1: Distribution of Bureaucracies Issuing Directives
Name Administrative
Rank
Beijing Directive
Count
Percent of
Directives
Beijing Municipal Internet
Management Office
Provincial-level
Municipality
Yes 310 50.65
Beijing Municipal Supervi-
sion Department
Provincial-level
Municipality
Yes 269 43.95
Beijing Municipal Internet
Police
Provincial-level
Municipality
Yes 8 1.31
Beijing Municipal Bureau of
Radio and Television
Provincial-level
Municipality
Yes 3 0.49
Shanghai Municipal Propa-
ganda Department
Provincial-level
Municipality
No 1 0.16
Guangzhou Municipal Su-
pervision Department
Provincial-level
Municipality
No 1 0.16
State Council Information
Office
National No 16 2.61
Ministry of Public Security
of the Central People’s Gov-
ernment
National No 2 0.33
Central Military Commis-
sion of the People’s Libera-
tion Army
National No 1 0.16
State Administration for In-
dustry and Commerce of
the People’s Republic of
China
National No 1 0.16
If local bias results in agency loss, we can expect to observe two main things from the
log data. First, it should be uncommon for non-Beijing Municipal Government agencies
to appear in directives because non-Beijing bureaucracies—especially non-Beijing local
governments—should have very little power to sanction Sina for non-compliance with
directives. In the case of Sina, the company falls under the jurisdiction of the provincial-
level municipal government of Beijing, as Sina is headquartered in Beijing. To measure the
distribution of directives sources, two research assistants coded the source bureaucracy for
all 8,427 unique censorship logs according to specific instructions about what constituted
a bureaucratic source. I manually checked all of their labels and searched the database for
any logs they may have missed. The resulting distribution of bureaucracies can be seen in
Table 1. Overall, 96.6 percent of directives come from Beijing Municipal bureaucracies.
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While other provincial-level bureaucracies can send directives to Sina, only two out of 611
specified directive sources in the logs are non-Beijing Municipal bureaucracies.21
If local bias results in agency loss, we should also see greater responsiveness to the
demands of the Beijing Municipal Government than other bureaucracies, particularly the
Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau and the Beijing Municipal Propaganda Depart-
ment. To test this, research assistants coded all instances in the logs where Sina Weibo
employees were directed defend government Weibo accounts, monitoring and deleting
comments that were offensive to that particular agency. Of the accounts Sina Weibo
protected, 46% were Beijing Municipal Government accounts, 46% were national-level
government accounts, and 8% were non-Beijing provincial-level government accounts. As
Sina Weibo users are not overwhelmingly concentrated in Beijing, this suggests that de-
cisions to censor content are locally biased.
Sina also appears to censor more efficiently when an event is salient to the Beijing
Municipal Government. In the aftermath of a flash flood in Beijing, citizens tried to
organize vigils for victims of the flood. Many logs related to this event indicate the
Supervision Department and the Internet Management Office’s keen interest in thoroughly
removing this mobilizing content from Sina Weibo.22 There was not much interest in
this particular event according to the blue book measures (in blue books, the degree of
interest in events is a proxy for their politial sensitivity to the national government), and
it appears to be an outlier in Figure 1. Censorship of this event was much more efficiently
implemented than other blue book events at all levels of interest in the event (see Figure
1). This is consistent with the theory that local bias due to fragmentation leads to agency
loss in the process of censorship delegation.
5 Conclusion
Leaked censorship logs from Sina Weibo provide an intimate look into the conflicting in-
formational preferences of the Chinese government and private internet companies. They
depict a system of multiple principals and multiple agents and a tangled web of competing
21One log includes a directive from the Shanghai Municipal Propaganda Department and another from
the Guangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau.
22A log from July 28, 2012 reads: “The Supervision Department requested we ramp up handling and
elimination of posts inciting and mobilizing netizens to hold vigils for victims of the Beijing torrential
rain disaster. A mobilizing post was discovered tonight and reported to the Supervision Department and
Internet Management Office.”
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informational objectives. The logs show that the outcome of censorship involves many
actors and does not necessarily reflect a unified government strategy. Rather, govern-
ment fragmentation and delegation to several corporate actors results in a system where
the end result of censorship is generated by the aggregated and contested preferences
of central leadership, subnational governments, and subnational elites passed through a
final layer of distortion: media corporations. The logs document outright disobedience
of directives, even in highly sensitive situations, and show how Sina Weibo strategically
disobeys directives in order to gain a edge over competitor Tencent Weibo. While much of
the academic literature and media depicts China’s censorship apparatus as swift, central-
ized, focused, and sophisticated, the system is often slow, fragmented, contentious, and
low-tech, making censorship orders difficult to enforce and giving social media companies
a great deal of discretion over what citizens do and do not see. Delegated censorship to
private companies results in significant agency loss that is then further compounded by
political fragmentation.
6 Developments Since 2014
In the last few months of log data, China’s information control institutions underwent
significant reforms. These reforms seemed aimed at addressing the problem of fragmen-
tation of China’s system of information control. In 2014, the Cyberspace Administration
of China (CAC) assumed its role as China’s chief regulator of cyberspace. The CAC
is a joint party and state organ that houses the SIIO (which is a continuation of the
SCIO23), and the General Office of the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and
Informatization which reports directly to the Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party. The creation of the CAC gave party and state organs unambiguous authority
over provincial and municipal bureaucracies regulating private internet companies such as
Sina Weibo.24 It is unclear from available data whether or not these reforms succeeded in
reducing agency loss resulting from political fragmentation. Since these reforms, however,
Sina and Tencent still appear to resist and defy regulations.
In 2015, the CAC threatened to shut down Sina Weibo due to insufficient censorship.25
23Technically, the SCIO was referred to as the SIIO after 2011. In late 2011 reforms, the SCIO’s rank
was elevated so that it directly reported to the State Council.
24See full report on the CAC here.
25See Wall Street Journal article here.
20
In 2017, the CAC imposed “maximum fines” on Sina Weibo, Tencent, and Baidu for
“failing to fulfill their management duties and violating China’s Cyber Security Law.”26
In 2018 Sina was ordered by the CAC to suspend “key portals such as its hot search
site and portal on celebrities and their personal lives for a week” due to its violation of
“relevant internet laws and regulations and spread illegal information.”27 In 2018 the
CAC suspended popular social networking site, Zhihu for one week for “lax supervision
and the spread of illegal information.”28 In late 2018 the CAC ordered the suspension
of news aggregators for several weeks due to “illegal” information sharing. Sina Weibo
has responded by expanding its efforts to censor content through crowdsourcing and
gamification, offering iPads to the best “Weibo Supervisors,” users who volunteer their
efforts to help Sina clean up harmful content.29
These developments are interesting. While Sina appears to increase efforts to police
harmful information, it does so through crowd-sourcers, in an attempt to cut costs. In
recent state media, the authorities noted that despite these increased efforts, they “are
not fully performing their duties.”30 Whether or not the poor performance of Sina and
other internet companies like it poor performance is due to continued defiance or low
capacity to censor, the CAC still seems concerned with agency loss.
7 Beyond China
Tensions and alliances between corporations and government actors, as well as govern-
ment delegation to corporations, are relevant far beyond the case of censorship in China.
The fraught alliance between social media companies and governments is representative
of a greater trend beyond the Chinese context, in authoritarian and democratic politics
alike. Corporations, especially in the realm of surveillance and data analytics are op-
erating on the behalf of governments to spy on citizens, enforce copyright laws, censor
information, and repress government opponents. These alliances represent a “broader
trend of neoliberal restructuring, in which political authority and decision-making power
are taken out of the public realm and transferred to private environments, often under-
26See Global Times article here: http://www.webcitation.org/71y4srDVO, and see a The Diplomat
article here: http://www.webcitation.org/71y4v72U0.
27See http://www.webcitation.org/71y4wnS1A.
28See http://www.webcitation.org/71y52ogK6.
29See http://www.webcitation.org/71y53kuQE.
30See http://www.webcitation.org/71y55KoD9.
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pinned by commercial and market logics” (Crouch, 2004; Hintz, 2016). Since the 2016
elections, it became increasingly clear how difficult it would be to hold social media com-
panies accountable for their actions. Behaviors that are in the public interest, such as
cleaning up bot accounts, preventing the spread of fake news, identifying and disrupting
foreign influence campaigns, monitoring hate speech, preventing the spread of violence,
and removing bad actors are often in conflict with fundamental profit motivations and
concerns about competitiveness. It took years for Twitter to take any meaningful action
on bot accounts, and they did so only under extreme public pressure, due to fears of a hit
to monthly active user statistics that would reduce its stock price.31
As the Snowden leak revealed, the PRISM program gave the NSA authority to request
that Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, and Google provide data matching keywords approved
by a U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court ruling. At large tech companies,
requests for information controls are released publicly, showing a tension between corpo-
rate and consumer preferences and states’ logic of social control (Tanash, Chen, Thakur,
Wallach, & Subramanian, 2015). Private companies often refuse requests out of concerns
for their users’ preferences, their profitability, and their reputation. An example of these
conflicts is Apple’s refusal to cooperate with FBI requests following the San Bernardino
terrorist attack. The FBI sought to compel Apple to break their own encryption so that
the FBI could obtain information on one of the suspect’s iPhones. Obeying such a request,
Apple said, would “threaten the security of our customers,” which Apple has trumpeted
as an advantage over competitor Google. In 2014, they boasted, “unlike our competitors,
Apple cannot bypass your passcode and therefore cannot access [customer] data.” Despite
public statements about Apple’s company values, their refusal is likely in part driven by
concerns about profits and competitiveness. Like Sina, Apple is not keen on giving into
government demands that would put it at a competitive disadvantage.
The relevance of tensions and partnerships between state and corporate actors is also
indicative of trends in Chinese reform that not only includes corporate actors in the pol-
icymaking process, but uses corporations as labs to create structures and institutions
that can later be subsumed into the state. For example, the very process of censorship
described in this paper has already been partially subsumed into the state. Employees
working in editorial functions at internet content producers (ICPs) in China can no longer
31See http://www.webcitation.org/71y56kNiL.
22
remain on private payrolls. This means that according to Chinese law, the employees who
censor content can no longer be employees of Sina Weibo, but now must be employees of
a government agency such as the Network Management Office or the Supervision Depart-
ment. Whether or not this solves principal agent problems identified in the censorship
system has yet to be seen, but control over the internet has been tightening at a rapid
pace over the last few years.
Other such plans to subsume institutions borne out of corporations seem on the hori-
zon. China is now relying on the infrastructure of Alibaba’s Alipay to serve as the
technical back-end to a national “social credit system” which merges social and financial
data to give users a score that can selectively restrict access to state and commercial
services, increase monitoring and policing of certain “untrustworthy” people, and even
determine what jobs an individual can have. Even more interesting are the institutions
that are being created within large companies such as Alibaba that mirror government
institutions. Alibaba’s disputes between suppliers and customers are resolved by a jury
of one’s peers and sentences are doled out by impartial judges; these roles are given to
users on Alibaba’s platform. Judges and juries decide how to split up money held in
escrow for disputed transactions made in the system. This corporate system alleviates
much of the strain put on rigid and ineffective legal institutions (Liu & Weingast, 2017).
Despite being a competitor to the existing bureaucratic system, the government appears
to tolerate its existence. It is conceivable and consistent with current trends that these
corporate structures might one day inform reform of legal institutions, or be subsumed
into the current legal system in China.
The trends outlined above and the relationship between Sina Weibo and government
actors in China may represent a potentially transformative shift in how states and corpo-
rations interact. More nimble and adaptive corporate structures may help authoritarian
governments leverage data to manage and monitor public opinion. Alternatively, corpo-
rate profit motives may prove to increase conflicts between state and society, leading to
reform or instability.
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